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DEBUNKING "CONSERVATIVE" ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
W. TODD AKJN*
The question of gay "marriage" is one that has been brewing
beneath the surface of public awareness for quite some time. But
with the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Law-
rence v. Texas' giving constitutional protection to consensual sod-
omy, the long awaited decision from the Massachusetts Supreme
Court regarding gay "marriage" in that state now decided,2 and
the introduction in Congress of a Federal Marriage Amendment
to the United States Constitution,' it seems that a perfect politi-
cal storm has converged.
Our country stands in severe danger of having the question
answered not by the people, through their elected representa-
tives, but rather having it imposed on them by judicial fiat.
Despite the majority's assertions that the Lawrence decision was
not the first step toward a finding of gay "marriage" as a constitu-
tionally protected right, I find Justice Scalia's comments in his
dissent in the case are far more compelling:
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional
law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disappro-
bation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state inter-
est" for purposes of proscribing that conduct; and if, as the
Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality),
"[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate con-
duct with another person, the conduct can be but one ele-
ment in a personal bond that is more enduring;" what
justification could there possibly be for denying the bene-
fits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "[t]he
liberty protected by the Constitution?" Surely not the
encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the
* United States Representative, Second District of Missouri. Staff mem-
bers Ryan Bradel and Franz Kohler contributed to the development of this
essay.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003).
3. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
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elderly are allowed to marry. This case "does not involve"
the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains
the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with
the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the
Court comfortingly assures us, this is so. 4
It took a relatively short period of time for the Court to
utterly reverse its finding in Bowers v. Hardwick,' the 1986 deci-
sion upholding the States' right to legislate on sodomy. Is it that
difficult to conceive that it would take an even shorter time for
the Court to merely extrapolate its finding in Lawrence and create
a "right" to gay "marriage," the assertions of Justice O'Connor
notwithstanding?6
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) is our
only protection against this coming storm.7 Despite the fact that
nearly every conservative in this country believes that the imposi-
tion of gay "marriage" by judicial decree is a real possibility, there
is not unanimous support for a constitutional amendment pro-
tecting marriage as many conservatives find the FMA to be in
violation of certain conservative principles. Their opposition to
the FMA is centered on the idea that it is a federal intrusion into
marriage and family law. They maintain that marriage has been
and should remain under the rightful jurisdiction of the states.
Former U.S. Representative Bob Barr (R-GA), the author of the
1996 Defense of Marriage Act,8 which defined marriage as con-
sisting only in the union of one man and one woman, has been
4. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
5. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor argued in her concurring opinion in Lawrence that the
Court's opinion did not find that same-sex marriages are constitutionally
protected:
That this law applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would simi-
larly fall under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legiti-
mate state interest here, such as national security or preserving the
traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of
same-sex relations-the asserted state interest in this case-other rea-
sons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral
disapproval of an excluded group.
Id.
7. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
The text of the Federal Marriage Amendment is as follows: "Marriage in the
United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither
this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall
be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups." Id.
8. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2003).
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widely quoted in opposition t9 the amendment saying that it is
"unnecessary and needlessly intrusive" and that "marriage is a
quintessential state issue."9 I concur that marriage is essentially a
state issue. Unfortunately, we face the very real possibility of the
judiciary making the issue a federal concern. Consequently, we
must pursue a Federal Marriage Amendment not only to pre-
serve the institution of marriage but also to preserve and
strengthen the States' historic jurisdiction over issues of marriage
and family law.
Many legal analysts predict that the most likely scenario that
will bring gay "marriage" to this country is one in which a State
court legalizes gay marriage in that State, same-sex couples from
around the country flock to that State to get married, return to
their home States and then sue for their home States to recog-
nize their marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution." ° Such a scenario would clearly
be an egregious violation of the principle of federalism because
it would provide de facto power to a single state to make broad
and far reaching decisions on social policy for all of the other
states. The Full Faith and Credit Clause contains a provision that
grants Congress the ability to regulate how exactly it should be
applied." The aforementioned Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) used this regulative power to exempt any State in the
Union from recognizing any same-sex relationship granted mari-
tal status by another state.12
Some would argue that DOMA, with its reliance on the Full
Faith and Credit Clause for its constitutional authority was all
that the federal government could rightly do regarding gay mar-
riage. I do not trust the federal judiciary to respect the will of the
people in this case. Should the Supreme Court find a right to
9. Carolyn Lochhead, Alliance Backs Ban on Gay Marriages, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 18, 2003, at A3.
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Con-
stitution reads: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
11. Id.
12. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2003). The essential
section of the Defense of Marriage Act reads:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
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same sex "marriage" within their privacy jurisprudence, then
DOMA surely will not survive the strict scrutiny that the Court
would apply to it under the Equal Protection Clause or the doc-
trine of substantive due process.
It begs mentioning that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
found that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is limited in its scope.
As recently as this year the Court reaffirmed the doctrine that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require "a State to substitute
the statutes of other States for its own statutes dealing with a sub-
ject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate."13
Clearly, according to the Court's own reasoning, a State
should under no circumstances be forced to recognize a mar-
riage which, through its competent legislation, has been found to
be anathema to the very notion of marriage. However, in light of
Lawrence, and with Justice Antonin Scalia, I am skeptical that the
Court will follow its own reasoning.
There is little doubt that if and when gay "marriage" is
imposed on the country it will come from the judiciary. As noted
above, the Supreme Court has laid the groundwork for such a
finding in its Lawrence decision. Such a decision would continue
the tradition the judiciary has established of taking for itself
authority delegated to the legislative branch of the federal gov-
ernment or to the States by the people. As Judge Robert Bork
notes, "[t]he areas of national life in Western nations now con-
trolled by the judiciary were unthinkable not many years ago.""
Whether it be abortion, the role of religion in the public square
or issues regarding homosexuality, there is not one major moral
question that the federal judiciary has not decided for the peo-
ple. The Federal Marriage Amendment would give our country
the opportunity for open and honest debate on homosexual
"marriage." In an age of increasing judicial hubris, the preserva-
tion of legislative power vis-a-vis the judiciary must be a core con-
servative aim. The question of federal intrusion into the area of
marriage has already been decided; it will happen. The only
question remaining is whether that intrusion will occur after
open and honest debate in which the people express their will
through their elected representatives or if that intrusion will be
mandated from the Supreme Court. No mere act of Congress
will preserve the institution of marriage or the maintenance of
democratic debate; it is only a constitutional amendment that
will put the people's will out of reach of the courts.
13. Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2003)
(quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
14. ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE 137 (2003).
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It is by no means unprecedented to use the amendment pro-
cess to achieve or sustain a societal good. In fact, the people of
the United States have resorted to the amendment process to
end slavery, secure voting rights, and provide equal protection
under the law for all citizens. These things have become the
hallmarks of our Republic. In these cases the people of the
United States realized that injustices existed which would be
repugnant to the very nature of the Republic. In these instances
they found it prudent to amend the Constitution in order to
secure within the "supreme law" rights and privileges fundamen-
tal to that nation and its people. The editors of the journal First
Things have poignantly described the role of marriage in society:
Marriage and family law reflects the historically cumulative
complexities of necessarily public concerns about prop-
erty, inheritance, legal liability, and the legitimacy of chil-
dren-the latter entailing a host of responsibilities for
which parents, and especially men, can be held accounta-
ble. One of the most fundamental prerequisites of social
order, it has been almost universally recognized, is the con-
tainment of the otherwise unbridled sexual activity of the
human male, and marriage is-among the many other
things that marriage is-the primary instrument of that
necessary discipline.15
It is noteworthy that for the healthy functioning of society
marriage must always be first and foremost about procreation
and the rearing of children. There is no other institution that is
adequately equipped to perform such a function. No child
should be sacrificed on the altar of political correctness by
depriving her of the benefits of a two-parent, heterosexual fam-
ily, which has overwhelmingly been shown to be beneficial to her
physical, mental, and emotional health.16
The Federal Marriage Amendment is not the beginning of
the development of federal marriage and family law. The intrica-
cies of this law must be left to the States. Rather, the FMA sets a
benchmark that preserves the existing public order from the
actions of activist courts and preserves to the States their historic
jurisdiction over marriage and family law. The FMA is not a fed-
eral usurpation. It is a necessary and proper step in preventing a
few federal judges from setting public policy for a nation pro-
foundly disinclined to redefine marriage and thereby fundamen-
tally alter the fabric of the society in which we live.
15. Editorial, The Marriage Amendment, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2003, at 15.
16. MARK A. REGAN, PRESERVING MARRIAGE IN AN AGE OF COUNTERFEITS:
How 'CIVIL UNIONS' DEVALUE THE RAL THING 14-15 (2001).
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